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The Joint Deployment System (JDS) forms the junction
among deliberate planning, time-sensitive planning, and the
deployment cf forces. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
(WIN) supplies the necessary interconnectivity among -.he
joint deployment community computer systems. In January
1982, the wkmccs Information System (HIS) modernization
program was launched with objectives including -he mcderni-
zaticn cf HWMCCCS hardware and software and the transfer
from the present WWMCCS network system to the Defense Data
Network (DDN). Because of proven WIN unreliability, the JDS
required site-unique software development to supplement
present WIN software.
Individualized application software, integrated with the
improved network reliability and survivability cf the DEN,
will enhance the present C3 system. This thesis demons-
trates that the total implementation of the WIS involves
additional modifications in site-unique applications, stand-
ardized procedures for software development, updated
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In the late seventies time-frame, the Joint Deployment
Agency (JEA) experienced an satis factory WWMCCS Intercomputer
Network (WIN) reliability for large data transfers tc remote
sites. The BWHCCS Information System (WIS) modernization
program addresses the WIN deficiency issues of power
supplies and multi-level security and proposes changes in
the WWMCCS network tc allow greater interconnect iv it y among
sites.
This thesis attempts to assess the WIS modernization
impact en large software systems in the WWMCCS community, in
particular, the Joint Deployment System (JDS). Specific
deficiencies in areas of hardware and software, surviv-
ability, and management will be addressed and planned
improvements analyzed. The modernization program should
improve computer int ereennectivity among the joint deploy-
ment community in the future, but the command-unique
software and WWMCCS standard software modifications will
provide the operational reliability necessary for operations
in the interim. With the conglomeration of subnetworks into
the Defense Data Network during the 1983-1986 time-frame,
plus the future WIS support of these command-unique software
applications and the improved WWMCCS Network, the joint
deployment community may experience a more reliable system
for cemputer resource sharing.

E. HILITARY C3 NETWORK
The Worldwide Military Command and Control System
(WWMCCS) cf the United States centers around the needs of
the National Command Authority (NCA) . A Command, Centre!
and Communications (C3) process can be considered an uncer-
tainty reducing technique which aids the commander in the
control of forces. & good C3 system must permit the secure
and timely flow cf information to points both inside and
outside the Department of Defense (DOD) . This flow must
exist during all scenarios -- day-to-day activities, crises,
conventional conflict, and nuclear war. The C3 system is a
major ingredient to the U.S. national goal of deterrence cf
war. [ Ref. 1: p. 53
]
Using WWMCCS, the NCA communicates its desires for
deployment of military forces to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS). In short, the JCS mission can be defined as the
execution of national decisions. This mission is supported
by various communications networks and command and control
systetrs, one of the nest central being the Joint Deployment
System (JCS) which provides a bridge between the deliberate
planning process and time-sensitive planning and execution.
Connectivity for these systems is provided by the National
Military Command System (NMCS) which consists of three
command centers: the National Military Command Center
(NMCC) , the Alternate National Military Command Center
(ANMCC) , and the National Emergency Airborne Command Pest
(NEACP) . Also included in the NMCS are the various
personnel and equipment necessary for adequate control cf
forces. [Ref. 2: p. 36]
The Defense Communications System (DCS) is the founda-
tion for worldwide communications during both peacetime and
crisis situations. The DCS covers the United States,
Europe, and the Pacific area with networks such as the

Automated Vcice Network (AUTOVON) , the Automated Secure
Voice Network(AUTOSEVCCOM) , and the Automated Digital
Network (AUTODIN). WWMCCS was astablished in 1962 and
supports the command functions of the NCA by supplying
information through an online data base system. Although
communications is a fundamental aspect of a C3 system,
simply having gocd communications does not equate to an
adequate conmand, control, and communications system. The
proper balance of command and control and communications, in
union with fcrces, results in maximum force effectiveness.
[RQf. 3: p. 40]
C. WWMCCS
WWMCCS evolved in the early 1960' s from a loosely knit
conglcmeraticn of about 158 computer systems, using 30
different software systems, and operating at 81 locations:
all serving the JCS, Unified and Specified commands, and the
Service cemmands. The majority of these systems were devel-
oped independently, consequently the lack of
intercperability within the total system proved detrimental
to its meeting the NCA requirements for intercommunications
among si::es. As the concepts of C3 grew, additional
requirements were demanded of the system; these requirements
were net sporadically, and by 1970, there was an evident
need for a WWMCCS modernization effort. In June of 1970,
the WWMCCS Automated Data Processing (ADP) Program was
initiated tc improve WWMCCS support. The program's goals
included
:
(1) reduction of cost through standardized hardware
and software
(2) development of a viable Data Base Management
System (DBMS) for data retrieval
(3) standardization of data formats
10

(4) centralization of 1aanag9ma.1t activities [Sef. U:
P. 2]
Prior to this effort, the WWMCCS program had no central
authority for its budgeting or management. Numerous organi-
zations were responsible for the various aspects of the
program; for instance, the WWMCCS Council provided policy
guidance for development and operation of the system; the
JCS evaluated WWMCCS* overall effectiveness; various
Assistant Secretaries of Defense provided advice on system
design and development, warning and intelligence matters,
and AEP procurements; and each service was responsible for
fundirg its eguipment acquisition and software development.
The WWMCCS System Engineering Office (WSEO) , a separate
organization in the Cefense Communications Agency (DCA) , was
organized in the raid 1970's to coordinate the general system
engineering of WWMCCS. One of the biggest, disadvantages to
the WWMCCS management structure was that, the Director.- CC?,
also Director, WWMCCS Engineering, reported to two organiza-
tions: the Assistant Secretary of Defense (C3I) for
organization and technical matters and the chairman cf the
JCS for doctrine, operational policies, and validation of
requirements. This, compounded with the fact that the
Director, DCA, had no authority for the budgeting or manage-
ment of the WWMCCS program, precluded the successful
coordination of WWMCCS ADP development efforts. [Ret- 5: p.
8]
The WWMCCS ADP Program also outlined a set of well-
defined reguirements which included the capability to
process large amounts of data within a reasonable time,
reliability greater than 99%, user and maintenance friendli-
ness, and small physical space and personnel requirements.
[Ref. 6: p. 22]
11

The WWMCCS functions which support related Hissicns are
grouped to allow each family of functions to be indepen-
dently defined and i nplemen ted. Interfaces among the
functional families are well defined. One of. the basics of
the WWMCCS architecture is the concept of four distinct
functional families which support the NC&, JCS, and Unified
and Specified Commands. They are:
(1) Resource and Unit Monitoring (RUM)
(2) Conventional Planning and Execution (CPE)
(3) Nuclear Flanning and Execution (NPE)
(4) Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment and Space
Defense (TW/SA and SD) [ Ref . 7: p. H-';]
In addition, WWMCCS ADP is divided into three catego-
ries. Category A includes the WWMCCS standard software, the
backbone of WWMCCS ACP which principally supports -.he
command and control requirements. Category 8 is that soft-
ware which is unique to a particular activity. And Category
C encompasses the newly emerging systems. [Sef. 8: p. 2]
As WWMCCS grew, utilization of the WWMCCS Intercomputer
Network (WIN) increased. The network was initiated as a
prototype at three sites and from 1977 to 1983 the number of
WIN sites jumped fron six to twenty-three, with future plans
eventually including all WWMCCS srtes. Commonly used func-
tions include:
(1) maintenance of status and location of forces and
resources
(2) planning for force mobilization and deployments
(3) preparation of the Single Integrated Operations
Plan (SIO?)
(4) estimating and monitoring Navy fleet fuel
consumption
(5) assisting in preparation and processing of
AUTODIN messages [Ref. 9: p. 5]
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The utilization cf the Joint Deployment System (JDS)
contributed to the increased activity on the WWMCCS network.
As a primary function, the JDS maintains Time-Phased Fores
Deployment Data (TPFDD) files for specific Opera-ion Plans
(OPLANs) outlining the supported commander's concept of
operations and requirements. [ Hef . 10: ;?. 11] Prior to
additional software development, these files were sent to
WIN subscribers in their entirety to initiate JCS exercises.
As the TFFDD files were updated through© it tha exercise, the
entire file was agair sent to ail asers. These large data
transfers, coupled with an overall increase in WIN usage,
placed a fcurden en network, componerts and host processors,
causing WIN performance to reach an unsatisfactory level.
Particular site-unique development included the JDS Remote
User's Package (RUP) , discussed in Chapter 3.
A new surfacing problem was the lack of a Multi-Level
Security (MLS) systerr. A MLS system allows users with
varying security clearances to simultaneously share computer
equipment with access to various software allowed on a
case-fcy-case security check. One theory for implementing a
MLS system is the usage of rings cf protective organization
for the hardware. Here, the operating system is segmented
into N-rings, with N greater than two. The inner-most ring
will te occupied by the core, or kernel, of the operating
system. The system software and security processes will be
run here; for instance, validation of passwords and data
access reguests. The resource allocation software should
reside in a seperate ring for scheduling of tasks and
computer resources. The outer rings are available to the
users for processing application programs. Routines in Ring
1 i* have access to Rings ' i' and all rings greater but can
only access more inner rings through procedure calls, thus
affording the proper security check opportunity. The rings
cf prctecticn secure sensitive software and data and also
act as firewalls against user damage. [Ref. 11: p. 540]
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It is interesting to note that in the mid-1960's -.h?
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Bell Telephone
Laboratories, and the computer department of the General
Electric (GE) Company developed sne of the first operating
systeits tc employ rings of protection, the Multiplexed
Information and Computing System (MOLTICS) . The original
MULTICS was installed on a G3645, later a Honeywell
Information System (HIS} 64 5 computer, and in 1973, replaced
by the HIS 6180. The HIS 6 130 supports eight rings cf
protection: the operating system uses Rings 0-3; Rings 4-7
are available tc the users*, [Ref. 11: p. 535] With no MLS
system, all machines, terminals, and personnel on the WIN
must te cleared to the highest level being utilized.
[Ref- 12: p. 7]
Cther problems included the lack, of a long-range plan
for WWMCCS/WIN development and the sarly 1960 Honeywell
architecture which is not tha state-of-the-art for an online
guery and response system.
A misconception was also prevalent concerning WWMCCS —
that it would provide communications between the President
and the foxhole. This was never the design intention of
WWMCCS; however, what was desired was a communications
network for several command echelons and a reliable military
command and control system connecting the NCA to the
executing commanders. [Ref. 1: p. 40]
Although the reliability of the WWMCCS Intercomputer
Network (WIN) had fallen below a satisfactory level, the
WWMCCS AEF sites utilized the on-site Honeywell computer
equipment tc develop software applications for unique
requirements. By the mid 1970*s, there was a great depen-
dency en WWMCCS ADP for day-to-day operations and
crisis/exercise support and the need for a reliable computer
network became obvious. [Ref. 12: p. 7]
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I*- W1HCCS INFORMATION SYSTEH
fl. BflCKGBOUND
Ie November 1931 F th€i Deputy Secretary of Defense
decided the HHMCCS Information System (WIS) modernization
plan needed a focal point for coordination to receive pclicy
and guidance directives from the JCS . In January 1982, a
WIS Jcint Program Manager (JPM) was appointed to control the
joint modernization activities of WWMCCS ADP an i the devel-
opment of all telecommunications interfaces. Small
site-unique enhancements will continue to be processed
normally. The WIS JPM receives direction from the JCS and
reports through the JCS to the Secretary of Defense.
[Ref. 8: p. 44]
A System Progam Office (SPO) was established within the
Air Force Electronic Systems Division to manage wis acquisi-
tion and provide support in such areas as architecture end
system engineering. The SPO also maintains Air Force
programming and budgeting data for the WIS modernization
plan. [Hef. 8; p. 44] T ae Director, DCA and the WIS JPM
have signed a Memorandum of Agreement which specifies the
guidelines for the Command and Control Technical Center
(CCTC) support to the WIS modernization effort.
The fcasic goal for the WIS modernization program is to
provide the NCA, JCS, and Unified and Specified commanders
with real time access to status and warning information.
WIS objectives include: improved WWMCCS performance,
greater WIN reliability, modernization of WWMCCS ADP harware
and software, and increased ADP security. Of the three
WWMCCS ADP categories mentioned previously, Wis will
centralize its effort on Category A -- WWMCCS standard
15

software. Cf the four functional families of operational
requirements, WIS will focus only on two: Resource and Unit
Monitoring (ROM) and Conventional Planning and Execution
<CPE) . The Air Force will continue to manage the WWMCCS AD?
systems in the Nuclear Planning and Execution (NPE) and
Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment and Space Defense (TW/AA
and SE) areas. [Hef. 8: p. 18]
E. SYSTEM DESIGN
The «WMCCS Information System (HIS) was designed as an
interactive network systam in which a user at any command or
agency can communicate with a user/host at any other command
cr agency also connected to the network. The Defense Data
Network (CDN) >ill provide the interconnection among WWMCCS
sites. A Network Operations Center will monitor the network
as a separate node on the DDN. Local area networks (LANs)
will exist for secure and interactive communications. The
advantages to LANs include: usual aase in configuring
systems to meet specific site requirements, development of
standard components for common functions, flexibility for
selective -nodern izat ion, and the ability to develop incre-
mental security solutions. Figure 2.1 graphically depicts
the user support scheme envisioned by WIS.
[Ref. 8: p. 3]
The WIS system objectives include:
(1) user-friendly interface development
(2) data processing capabilities for all WWMCCS
sites
(3) reliable inter- command communications
(4) improved processing capabilities during battle


















LOCAL USER WORK STATIONS
• COMMANO CENTER PERSONNEL
• CRISIS ACTION TEAMS
• OPERATIONS SUPPORT PERSONNEL
Figure 2.1 User Support Overview.
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Projected WIS characteristics to accomplish these goals
















organic SIS support for major sites
remote access capability for small sites
user access from a single work station
a multi-level security system
minimum site training requirement
ty characteristics:
secure and interactive network
operational for day-to-day and crisis support
and flexitilty characteristics:




[Bef. 8: p. 16]
C. SISTEB STRUCTURE GUIDELINES
The WIS JPM Cffice has developed guidelines for WIS
system requirements in the areas of standardization,
security, and system characteristics.
Hardware standardization will not be mandatory because
of the numerous existing systems and the competitive
procurement possibilities. Software development standardi-
zation will be achieved through the exclusive use of ADA as
the program design language. Standard, pr e-determined
protocols will set the intercomputer communications stan-
dards. Routine and emergency maintenance will be monitored
by a single organization; maintenance standards will be
imposed. To facilitate cooperation among the remote sites,




The core of the WIS security program lies in the multi-
level secure LANs with secure interfaces to all other Wis
components. Authentication for users will be applied as a
security ccntrol with an audit, capability available. DCD
security requirements require that a multi-level security
system be achieved within the WIS modernization program.
[Ref. 8: p. 34]
The WIS modernization program will provide capabilities
to improve communication survivability and AD? support to
WWMCCS sites. Seme proposed capabilities are:
(1) distributed and/or redundant processing with
rimcte access
(2) graceful degradation
(3) rapid restart and recovery
(4) distributed data files
(5) transportable systems
Standards for accessibility include the ability to
access all wis-related capabilities from a single worksta-
tion. Other required system capabilities are flexibility,
reliability, maintainability, and interoperability.
[Ref. 8: p. 35]
D. IBPLEBENTATION
WIS will be implemented during four modernization
segments and utilizir.g four major contracts. The
Maintenance Segment includes the near-term enhancements to
the baseline hardware and software to stabilize WIS perfor-
mance and will be accomplished through the Integration
Contract. Next, the Transition Segment, linked to the
Common User contract, transfers the user communities from
the existing WWMCCS ADP to the WIS modular architecture for
future modernization and initiates the Automated Message
Handling capabilty. The Joint Mission Segment concentrates
19

en th€ common applications software modernization; the Join-
Mission Hardware contract will provide -he standard hardware
case and supporting operating system by late FY85. The
final segment will be the Service and Command unique appli-
cation software improvements which will be the
responsibility of the Services and user commands. Figure
2.2 illustrates the HIS growth through the four moderniza-
tion segments. [Hef. 8: p. 3] The last major contract, the
Configuration Management contract, provides for independent
validation of the software provided by the Integration and
Common User contractors. In addition, this contractor will
assist the WIS JPM in the overall configuration management
of WIS. [ Re f- 13: p. 9]
E. EvALUATICN/COMPABISON EFFORT
As mentioned earlier, one of the major problems in the
WWMCCS community is the unsatisfactory performance of the
WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN). In September 1981,
Director, DCA organized an effort to investigate the
replacement of the present WWMCCS network system with a mere
contemporary system.
Initially, the idea surfaced to take advantage of the
proven AUTOEIN I technology and develop an AUTODIN II. It
was envisioned that AUTODIN II would provide a common use-
data network with a multi-level security system to meet
network reguirements through 1985. In 1976, the contract
was awarded to Western Union, Inc. and the Initial
Operational Capability (IOC) was set for January 1979.
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Eeginr.ing in 1979, the IOC date was extended savsril
times until July 1980, when the Assistant Secretary of
Defense fcr Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence (ASDC3I) requested a review of the AUTODIM II
project with some possible alternative proposals. In July
1981, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for C3I
(DUSDC3I) questioned the wartime survivability of AUTCDIN
II. Ihe doubt focused on one of the basic design criteria
for the system -- a small number of switching nodes. These
switching nodes would require manning and would be rela-
tively expensive. Immediately after this, the Air Force
Test Director issued a report concerning the increasing cost
of the system and doubts about the technology and future
systen performance. [Ref. 14: p. 45]
In late 198 1 the Director, Defense Communications Agency
(DCA) established three design teams:
Team 1 -- tasked with designing the best possible,
survivable A0TODIN II system
Team 2 -- tasked with designing the best alternative
which would te based en the ARPANET and WIN tech-
nology, a Replica approach
Team 3 -- a 30-day evaluation team.
The evaluation team was to establish guidance fcr the
two design teams and develop evaluation criteria. [Ref. 1<*:
p. 45] Seme of the evaluation factors considered were
survivability, security, system design, and cost. The
ARPANET replica proposal, referred to as the Replica, seemed
better able to withstand network element losses, proposed a
itore flexible routing algorithm, and afforded a greater
mobility capability. [Ref. 15]
AUTOEIN II now had a six-year old design and, because of
continuous technology advances, the expected life of a
computer system is about eight years. In the area of large
data transfers, AUTODIN II was superior to the Replica
22

design. The Replica design would be using smaller packets
for message transfers throughout the network — smaller
packets necessitate more numerous packets which in turn
increase the overhead traffic through the system and car.
degrade system performance. If AUTODIN II had been avai-
lable fcr inplementation during the evaluation effort time
frame, the technology, schedule, and cost risks associated
with the Replica proposal would certainly have cancelled
some of the benefits. However, having no satisfactory
AUTODIN II system online, the benefits of the Replica
approach justified the risks. [ Ref . 15]
In constant FY82 dollars, AUTODIN II total system cost
was estimated at $588 million where the Replica total system
cost was $429 millicr. It was projected that the AUTO CIS II
annual operating costs would steadily increase to 572
nillicn until 1995, where the annual cost would level off
near $55 nillion. The Replica system annual cost is
expected to peak at $71 million around 1985 and steadily
decrease to the $40 million range in 1987. Figure 2.3 shews
DDN/Eeplica annual ccsts. [Ref. 15]
In February 1982, the evaluation was completed. Sased
en the conclusions the Director of DCA decided the Replica
apprcach would provide a better DOD data network.
Consequently, the Deputy Under Secretary cf Defense crdere-3
the termination of the AUTODIN II network and the initiali-
zation of the Replica design, to be known as the Defense
Data Network (DDN) . [Ref. 14: p. 45]
F. DFFEHSE DATA NETSORK
The Eefense Data Network (DDN) will provide the wis
community with the secure, reliable, interactive network
necessary tc perform its functions. The DDN is designed as
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Figure 2-3 DDN/Replica Annual Costs
compl€t=d network will have 91 subscriber systems with
approximately 488 hosts and 1,446 terminals. There? will be
171 switching nodes at 85 sites. The DDN meats the
Worldwide Digital System Architecture (WWDSA) standards and
objectives by providing a solid technology base, low risk,
and a cost effective system. This network will satisfy
current survivability requirements during a crisis and meet
COD intercomputer telecommunication requirements supplied by
the JCS. [Bef. 16: p. 2]
The major DDN design concepts are standardized compo-
nents, distributed switching nodes, and automatic fault
recognition. Standardized components allow smallsr develop-
ment costs and lower maintenance and support costs. Also,

component modularity reduces the maintenance impact.
Distributed switching nodes aid in eliminating chcke points
which increases the overall survivability of the system. A
wide distribution of switching nodes asually minimizes any
impact after a single node failure. Another ms.jor concept,
the DEN automatic fault recognition system, is implemented
through a series of Monitoring Centers (ffCs) which are in
continuous cperation to monitor network performance and
identify trouble areas.
The network Monitoring Centers will be key nodes on the
DDN network. There will be a principal system MC, an alter-
nate MC, regional MCs for Europe and the Pacific area, and a
MC for each keyed community. Primary functions for the
monitoring centers will include:
(1) monitoring the status of the network
(2) isolating network faults
(3) supporting software maintenance
(4) providing network element information [Ref. 16:
p. 5]
The Defense Data Network will provide four levels of
support to the current WWMCCS community;
Level 1 — hcst processor sites for Resource and
Unit Monitoring (RUM) and Conventional Planning and
Execution (CEE) support
Level 2 — limited on-site processor support plus
access to remote host processors
Level 3 — processor support through network access
to remote processors in Hawaii
Level 4 — support through individual terminals
connected to remote hcst data processors £Ref. 8: p.
27]
The Defense Data Network is designed for continuous
operation tc support real time handling of ail user's
traffic. The availability goal is greater than 99% for any
25

pair cf users. [Ref„ 17: p. 5] The three major DDN £js*--<?.®
elements are switching nodes, IPLIs, and Mini-TACs.
The switching r.cde used for the DDN is a Eolt Beranek
and Newman (EBN) C/30 switch, a microprogrammed minicomputer
designed for unattended operations which eliminates the need
for DEN dedicated personnel at each switching node. The
throughput capability of each C/30 node is 300 packets per
second in tandem processing -- 300 packets in, 300 packets
switched, and 300 packets out simultaneously, for a total of
900 packets being handled. The long term reliability goal
is 5000 hours or greater for Mean Time Between Failures
(MTBF). The developient risks are low since the C/30 switch
and its software are functioning elements on such networks
as the ARPANET; WIN; Community On-Line Intelligence Network
(COINS); Intelligence Data Handling System, Communications
(IDHSC) ; and the European Movement Infcrmafion Network
(MINE!). Technology risks are considered low since only
minor modifications are neccessary. [Eef. 16: p. 33]
The Internet Private Line Interface (IPLI) is based on
the Private Line Interface (PLI) which has been used on the
ARPANET and other networks for more tha.n five years. The
PLI/IPLI technology allows the simplest of end-to-end
encryption available. An ILPI will reside between a host
and switching node or Mini-Terminal Access Controller
(mini-TAC) and switching node, depending on site configura-
tion. The IPLI is currently under development with an
initial delivery date of July 1983. It will support the
standard EOD protocol, Internet Protocol (I?) , and widesp-
read deployment is expected because of reduced cost, size,
and power and weight reguirements from the PLI currently
being used. The IPLI hardware consists of a KG-84 crypto-
graphic device and two Motorola MC68000- based packet
processors. A minimum of fifty packets per second is set as
a throughput goal and the MTBF goal is at least 5000 hours.
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The Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is expected to be approxi-
mately thirty minutes with an availability of 99.93. The
IPLI requires no additional personnel and the maintenance
and mcnitcrirg systems may be operated from a remote sits.
The devalcpment risk involved is considsred low due to the
traditional architecture used. [Eef. 14: p. 39]
A Mini- Terminal access Controller (mini-TAC) is a
terminal access device which allows a cluster of up to
sixteen terminals sinuixareous access to the network. The
hardware of a mini-TAC is a MC68000 microprocessor with
memory and multiple network interface ports. The mini-TAC
software is based on the software developed for use en the
ARPANET and allows terminal users to establish connections
between their terminals and an arbitrary host on the
network. The DOD standard IP and Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) are used. The iiTBF goal is greater than 5000
hours and the board- swap ping capability simplifies mainte-
nance. Since the mir.i-TAC is also designed fcr unattended
operations, no dedicated personnel are required. Control
menitcring and hardware/software fault isolation can be
accomplished remotely by the MCs. Mini-TAC availability is
expected during FY84* [ Ref - 16: p. 42]
Cne cf the major comparison factors for the AUTOCIN
II/DDN evaluation was survivability. The small number cf
nodes proposed fcr the AUTODIN II system left major doutt as
to its survivability. DDN ? s survivability features include:
(1) redundancy -- the final system will comprise 171
switching nodes, 9 fixed monitoring centers, and 5
mobile r econstitution nodes with MC capability
(2) disseminated switching nodes -- geographically
dispersed sites afford the higher priority users a
greater chance of reconstitution
(3) a dynamically adaptive routing algorithm which
automatically reroutes traffic around heavily cong-
ested or damaged links and nodes
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(4) graceful degradation because of the network's
response to damaged nodes
(5) four levels of precedence/preemption processing
(6) hardening and HEMP protection including electro-
magnetic shielding, line isolation, and power surge
protection
(7) reconstitution — the five mobile reconstitut ion
nodes will be positioned in areas less likely tc be
targeted and all users will have a detailed alterna-
tive routing plan
(S) preplanned rehoming -- all users will have a
priority listing of switching nodes for rehomirg
[Ref. 16: p. 125]
DEN security will be accomplished through link encryp-
tion, end-tc-end encryption, and physical and procedural
security measures. The KG-84 cryptographic devices will
provide the necessary link encryption. The Internet Private
line Interface (IPLI) devices between the host and switching
node cr mini-TAC and switching node will provide the
end-tc-end encryption. The IPLI will also separate subscri-
fcers operating at different system security levels. For
physical security measures, ail switching nodes will be
TEMPEST enclosed and located in secure military facilities.
Only System Monitoring Center (SMC) personnel will be able
to retrieve traffic statistics. All personnel at regional
and system !*Cs and personnel with access to switching redes
will held a SECRET clearance. In addition, personnel with
access to a MC for a secure subnetwork must also be cleared
to the highest security level of the subnetwork subscribers.
[Ref. 16: p. 12]
The ECN program office is within the DCA organization
and consequently comes under DCA's staffing and policies.
The National Security Agency (NSA) has the responsibility
for certifying and accrediting the IPLI devices and
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analyzing the network system design for use with classified
traffic. DDN subscribers will be responsible for acquiring
the necessary hardware and software for DDN operation and
support. [Ref. 14: p. 258]
Another major factor considered during the evaluation
phase was cost. According to the evaluation team, the "DDN
I system can provide COD with a survivable, common-user
systea at a cost less than being paid for the dedicated
systems...". [ Ref . 16: p. 15] Using FY32 dollars, the 91
dedicated systems listed in the user requirement; data bass
cost ever $35.2 million for annual operation. The annual
cost for th= new DDN system includes:
System Management 3,3 54 K (10.335)
Trunk/Access Lines 24,694 K ( 7.6?)
Operations and Management 4,428 K (13. 6%)
Total $32,476 K Annually
When development and acquisition costs are included, DDN
annual operating costs average $35,549 million over a ten
year period. [Hef, 16: p. 255]
Tbe Defense Data Network system design builds on three
operational networks which use the B3N C/30 switching node
and accompanying software:
(1) ARPANET — with 90 nodes at 75 locations
(2) WIN — with 26 nodes at 16 locations
(3) MINET — with European locations [Ref- 17: p. 2]
The DDN will employ a four stage implementation approach
which should lead to a graceful evolution capitalizing on
existing networks and interfaces with minimum risk for new
technologies. The ARPANET will supplement DDN's test and
development facilities but will remain as a scaled-down
research network. It will later serve as an operational
testbed for future DDN software releases. [Ref. 16: p. 24]
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The four transition stages for DDN I are:
Stage 1 — Service will be provided to subscribers that
can be handled with minimum development. The WWMCCS Netwcrk
C/30 switch upgrade will be accomplished during this stage.
Communities of interest and networks with differing security
leve.'ls will be physically separated into three distinct
networks:
(1) Strategic Air Command Digital Network (SACDIN)
— at a Top Secret (TS) system-high security level
(2) Military Network (MILNET) -- for unclassified
subscribers tc include military ARPANET users
<3) Command and Control Intelligence (C2I) Network
— with a TS system-high security level netwcrk with
twc subnetwork communities:
the C2 Comnunity basically for WIN subscribers and
the Intelligence Community primarily for IDHS
II/Department of Defense Intelligence Information
Systems (DCDIIS) users.
Stage 1 is expected tc be completed by end of FY33.
Stage 2 — As additional IPLIs become available during
198H, more subscribers will be added to the network. The
mini-IACs will be implemented in Stage 2, also. Completion
is expected by the end of FY84.
Stage 3 — During Stage 3 r the three separate networks
originated during Stage 1 will be integrated to become the
DDN I, supporting multiple levels of security. During this
stage, additional classified subscribers will be incorpo-
rated intc the network. Stage 3 will be completed by the
end cf FY85.
Stage 4 — As hcst interfaces are developed, ail
remaining DDN subscribers will be included in the network.
The final DDN I netwcrk will consist of 171 nodes supporting
91 systems, and the CEN system design allows for a moderate
increase in traffic from each netwcrk user. [Ref. 16: p.
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189] Figure 2.4 shows the transition plan for the DON I.
[fief. 16: p. 190]
G. WIS/EEN CONNECTION
Currently, the Defense Communications Agency provides
WWMCCS software suppcrt through the Command and Control
Technical Center (CCTC) . Although the wis modernization
plan is net a part of DCA, the WIS JPM and the Director of
DCA have entered a Memorandum of Agreement which insures
CCTC support during the WIS modernization effort. Hcwever,
since plans call for the Defense Data Network (DDN) to be
integrated into the ECS, the DDN program office falls under
the DCA organization . The DDN will provide a common user
network, capable of incorporating the majority cf the C3
networks available tcday and providing a standard, secure
and shared-resource capability.
The DEN will not be restricted to support cf the WWMCCS
community. As can be seen frcm Figure 2.4, networks such as
the SAC Digital Network (SACDIN) and the ARPANET will
utilize the Defense Data Network for intercommunications
among member sites. With these various user communities
riding en one network system, a multi-level security system
is imperative, although technology hinders the development
cf such a system. The management of the DDN network, a
network where users range from unclassified military users
en the ARPANET tc high classification users of the JDS on
the WIN, has not been sufficiently addressed and will become
the scurce cf major problems.
As DDN comes intc being, new WWMCCS standard software
will be implemented under the WIS modernization plan and
existing site-unique software will be modified to reflect
the updated system. These software changes and future hard-
ware acquisitions will affect every system used within the
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WWMCCS community . The WIS modernization impact will be felt
by all users supported by the Joint Deployment System (JDS),
cne of the most widely used WWMCCS systems and the total
management system coordinating the links between deliberate
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III. JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
A. EACKC-BOUND
In October 1978, the JCS conducted a command post exer-
cise, NIFTY NUGGET, to test full mobilization and deployment
capabilities for U.S. forces. NIFTY NUGGET exposed defi-
ciencies in both the military deployment planning and
execution process as well as the supporting Management
Information System (EIS) . The systems most widely utilized
during NIFTY NUGGET included the Joint Operational Planning
Systeir (JCPS), Unit Status and Identification Report
(UNITEEP) System, and command unique systems such as the
Deployment Management System (DEPMAS) used by the U.S.
Readiness Ccmmand (USREDCOM) . JOPS supported planning but
supplied no support fcr the execution phase. The UNITfiEP
system was net responsive tc time-sensitive decisions.
CEPHAS was not available to the joint deployment community,
the system dealt with Army and Air Force forces only. The
need fcr a centralized deployment and decision support
system fcr planning and execution was evident. In March
1979, the Jcint Deployment Agency (JDA) was established tc
support the JCS and supporting commanders as the nucleus of
depioymsnt and associated activities. [ Ref . 10: p. 3]
The Jcint Deployment System (JDS), resident at the Jcint
Deployment Agency, was created to support the JDA mission.
The JCS includes personnel, procedures, directives, communi-
cations systems, and electronic data processing systems
which support peacetime planning and time sensitive planning
and procedures. The JDS concept is the development of a
single support system for all stages of deployment manage-
ment with particular focus on planning, deployment
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execution, and crisis monitoring. After the JCS exercise
order is delivered, the JDS allows the monitoring of move-
ment of forces, materiel, and non-unit related personnel.
The Master Force List (MFL) file, schedule file, scheduling
requirements and UNITREP data are generated from the deploy-
ment data base and distributed to users. [Ref. 10: p. 18]
Through the JDS, the Joint Chiefs can achieve direct imple-
mentation of their deployment decisions during peacetime,
command post exercises, crises, and war. [Ref. 18: p~ 1]
E. JES/WIN LINK
The mission of the JDA obviously depends on interccnr.ee-
tivity among the joint deployment community. The WWMCCS
Intercomputer Network (WIN) is used to organize these
geographically separated host computers into a single
netwerk ard becomes the backbone of the JDS communications
system, essential in the planning and execution of deploy-
ment decisions. The deployment data oase depends on WIU fo:
accurate information exchange between user sites and the
JDA. [Ref. 19: p. 1] Figure 3.1 illustrates the WIN rela-
tionships within the joint deployment community. [Ref. 20:
p. 12]
Transaction throughput is site dependent but a JEA site
will usually average 1200 transactions per hour. Dser
response tine is dependent en the number of users simultane-
ously accessing WIN. For example, with an average of ten
simultaneous users, SIN response time averages two to five
seconds. Ten is considered a small number of users and one-
ever ten, significant performance degradation is experi-
enced. [Ref. 18: p. 13] The WIN software available for



































































Program used for message exchange ar.d direct. access to
resources of remcte hosts, the File Transfer Service (FTS)
used mainly for large bulk transfers between sites (i.e.,
the TPFDE file and TPFDD file changes) , and the
Teleconference (TLCF) capability which simultaneously links
any number cf WIN nodes into a textual exchange conference.
AUTODIN is the general message exchange system which may
also te used for guery/response activities and NACE trans-
fers data between the JDS and AUTODIN, automatically
formatting the messages generated by JDS. [Ref. 10: p. 18]
C. AEP GCALS ANE CAPABILITIES
The Joint Deployment System ADP criteria goals include
an availability cf 2U hours a day, 7 lays a week, except fcr
scheduled maintenance and unexpected outages. The operatic?,
goal is 95^ for routine processing and 99% for crisis and
exercise operations. The deployment data base is resident
at JDA with the irajor backup at R2DC0M. The JDA and SEECOH
computer systems are comprised of four processors organized
in dual ccnf igur at icr. with shared disk drives, colccat~d in
the same facility. The JDS reliability goal for MTBF :'.s 36
hours with l^TTR of 10 minutes. When fully developed,- JDS
will he a transaction-oriented communications system capable
of real-time processing on a distributed data base within
the WIN environment. [Ref. 10: p. 32]
The JDS computer system availability not only depends on
the hcst computer up/dcwn ratio; other factors include the
supporting WWMCCS system software such as the Time-Sharing
Systei (TSS) and the General Comprehensive Operating System
(GCOS) , the JDS software which includes the Remcte User's
Package (HUP), and WIN availability. All cf these ccmrc-
nents must be available for a remote user to access the
deployment data base. JDS will allow interfaces with
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appropriate service and com mand- unique data systems for
accurate information flow among the joint deployment
community.
Th€ JDS is divided into 5 procedural subsystems:
(1) plan genera-ion — expansion of the data base
fcr inclusion of new data
(2) plan maintenance — modification of the data
case to reflect changing resources or constraints
(3) execution preparation — adjustments to plan
data to account for real world dates and require-
ments
(4) scheduling -- coordination and distribution of
transportation schedules developed in conjunction
with the Transports ting Operating Agencies (TCAs)
,
i.e., Military Airlift Command (MAC), Military
Traffic Management Command (MTMC), and Military
Sealift Command (MSC)
(5) movement monitoring — reporting of the status
of the deployment, departures, and arrivals
[Bef. 10: p. 20]
The Joint Deployment System offers the joint deployment
ccmnunity five processing alternatives:
(1) Time Sharing System (T3S) -- simultaneous access
of the computer system by more than one user
(2) batch updating — primary system for JDS data
base control
(2) transaction processing -- data base updating
through one of twenty-three Transaction Service
Modules (TSMs) which maintain a near real-time
information flow between WIN sites
(U) stand-alone programs — software sent over the
WIN network to update the JDS data base
(5) Remote User's Package (RUP) -- provides the
capability tc send and receive transactions from
ether WIN sitas [Ref. 21: p. 34]
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Users may access lccal or remote deployment data bases
using any one of four methods. Twenty-two on-line queries
are available on the time sharing system. The Management
Data Query System (MECS) for retrievals allows the user tc
originate a batch process for information retrieval from the
Master Force List (MfL) file and schedule files. The MFL
file also allows users without the HUP capability to
initiata information queries. Users can also utilize the
automatic scheduling messages package to automatically
receive movement data for the next twenty-four hours through
the NJfCC Automated Control Executive (NACE) . [fief. 21: p.
65]
D. DEVEICPMEMT
The Jcint Deployment System is being developed in five
stages. The Baseline Stage has been completed and JDS now
provides service to the jcint deployment community. The
Initial Cperational Capability (IOC) for the second stage,
which includes limited on-line update and query features,
distributed processirg support via tne Reaicts User's Package
(RUP) , and data base backup at R2DC0M, was achieved December
1982. The third stage incorporates long-term requirements
definition and validation. These additional requirements
will support the Crisis Action System (CAS) and will empha-
size such things as nulti-plan support and no-plan support.
The fourth stage is Bull Operational Capability (FOC) and
the ICC is presently December 1985. Since JDS is the center
cf the Conventional Elanning and Execution (CPE) functional
family of the WWMCCS ADP program, the fifth stage, Post-FOC,
will detail the JDS integration into the WIS modernization
program. [Bef. 10: p. 78]
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Tfce JDS data base presently contains 108 record types
chained in logical record relationships in the Honeywell
Integrated Data Store (IDS) structure. The data includes
information en forces, nonunit personnel and cargo, move-
ment, and transportation. The JDS is a conglomeration cf
375 application programs and subprograms which maintain and
manipulate the deployment data base. The majority cf the
JDS software works or. menu- selection and pre-defined display
screens. Although the entire data base is resident at the
JDA, various deployment community members will maintain
separate data bases to satisfy unique command requirements
and command and control functions. Each of these sites will
also maintain a Data Ease Management System (DBMS) and local
access to the main data base. These distributed data cases
will re subsets of the master data bass and will be main-
tained concurrently with the master by near-simultaneous
(within five minutes) distribution of data transactions.
This distribution will significantly reduce WIN activity and
network performance degradation associated with large data
transfers. The distributed data bases will also enhance JDS
survivability by providing multiple backup locations for JDA
functions. [Ref. 10: p. 25]
E. F0HCTIONS
One cf the major JDS functions is to provide a bridge
between deliberate planning and time sensitive planning and
execution. The two systems utilized during these procedures
are the Joint Operational Planning System (JO?S) and the
Unit Status and Identification Report (UNITRE?) System.
JOPS establishes procedures for planning and executing
deployments during peacetime and crisis situations as
directed by JC3; the UNITRE? System contains the location
and identification of actual military units needed during
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The JDSthe planning and execution phases of deployment,
supplies the necessary link between these two systems by
maintaining an up-to-date deployment data base. [Hef. 10:
p. 9 ] Figure 3.2 graphically illustrates the JDS connection
between deliberate planning ard time -sensitive planning and
execution. [Ref. 10: p. 10]
During the deliberate planning phase, Time-Phased Force
Deployment Data (TPFDD) files are developed for a specific
Operation Plan (CPLAN) using JOPS and UNITREP. The initial
data is collected frcm supported commanders and service
requirements. The JDA holds a two-phase conference for
refinement of the data and then the TPFDD is incorporated
into the JDS data base for that specific OPLAN. This method
provides the primary source of input into the JDS. Seme
problems with these procedures are the time-consuming
conferences and reviews and the manual manipulation of the
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F. REHOTf USER'S PACKAGE
Since the majority of JDS users are remote and the File
Transfer Service (FTS) on WIN has proven to be slow ard
unreliable, the Joint Deployment Agency developed the Remote
Oser's Package (HUP) to offset some of these problems. The
RUP is installed at selected WIN sites to alleviate seme of
the network overloading caused by large data transfers.
When utilizing the Remote User's Package, no direct connec-
tion tc the JDA host via WIN TELNET is required to access
the data base. [Ref. 21: p. 26] Since the RU? permits users
to input, update and query transactions via their own
Time-Sharing system (TSS) and the data base is then accessed
through WIN, users experience a significant degradation of
own TSS response time. The JDS Remote User's Package
includes an Interface Processor (JOSI?) , an Update Processor
(JDSUP) , a time-sharing package, and a batch update
capatility. [Ref. 1S: p. 7]
The JCSIP provides the necessary communications protocol
for transaction processing between two WIN sites. The
sending site JDS I? breaks bulk files into individual tran-
sactions, then the receiving site JD5I? accepts e=;ch
transaction and passes it to the JDS if a WIN connection is
available or holds the transaction until a connection is
made. An acknowledgement is necessary from the receiver
tefore the next transaction (packet) is sent. The Remote
User's Package essentially transforms the WWMCCS
Intercomputer Network into a transaction processing system,
as was the original design goal for WIN. The capabiitiy now
exists for transaction update processing between two WIN
sites in near- reel tine without dependence on a WIN
connection to the JDS. [Ref. 19: p. 9]
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The JESIP of the receiving site forwards the transac-
tions to the JDS Update Processor (JDSUP) for individual
inclusion into the data has?. The J DSD? is capable cf
receiving input transactions from the time-sharing cr batch
systen, WIN via the JDSIP and PTS capability, and AUTODIN
via the NACE processors. The Update Processor provides
dynamic recovery check points during processing without task
interruption. If necessary, transaction processing recovery
is achieved after a communications interruption using these
checkpoints, thereby no longer requiring -as complete
reinitialization cf the task. [Ref. 19: p„ 9]
Although JDA-generated software has greatly improved JDS
performance, particularly in the WIN arena, additional
improvements are necessary. JDS should be supported by
software which requires a minimum amount of training and
skills due to the computer experience of :ncst users; for
instance, JCS action officers. Users have recommended the
information displays be modified to remove the time-frame
distinction cf 'deliberate' or 'crisis' planning. Although
the data is now maintained quarterly by the Command and
Control Technical Center (CCTC)
,
part of DCA, the JDS
deployment data tase should move towards real-time mainte-
nance tc constantly provide a current deployment situation
data tase resident at JDA. [Ref. 10: p. 13]
Additional areas for general system improvement include:
(1) revising man-machine interfaces for simplifica-
tion
(2) aggregating information for senior level
managers on general JDS capabilities
(3) insuring more accurate and timely data collec-
tion
(4) developing standard data definitions
(5) enhancing the recovery and backup facilities




As previously discussed, the information flow between
the NCA and military forces depends upon a reliable, sacure,
and survivable intercomputer network. The WWMCCS
Intercomputer Network (WIN) was designed to provide exchange
of information through computer-to-computer and remote
terminal-to-computer processing using distributed data base
concepts and workload sharing techniques. [Ref. 5: p. 42]
WWMCCS svclved through the early years as services developed
hardware and software to meet unique requirements. Eased on
the evolutionary approach to systems development, HWMCCS
should evolve through requirements specifications as opposed
to the traditional system acquisition approach. This theory
is supported by a lack of specific C3 system criteria;
poorly understood C3 systems concepts; language barriers
between the policy makers, planner.-;, and commanders; and the
nebulcus framework for C3 systems evaluation. [Ref. 5: p.
16] There are numerous systems other than C3 systems which
suffer from one cr mcrs of the problems mentioned. For
instance, any highly specialized system will likely experi-
ence barriers among technologists and users.
As prcven with the early WWMCCS, allowing users to
develop small, unique systems independently, precludes the
integration of these systems into a responsive, larger
system. Cbviously, interoperability was net the primary
concern for these individual funding efforts. Twenty years
later, WWMCCS remains somewhat fragmented due to the absence
cf a centralized, long-range plan for the management and
tudget ccntrcl of WWMCCS and the Defense programs affecting
WWMCCS. With the WWMCCS Information System (WIS) , a Joint
Program Manager (JPM) Office was established to provide
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centralized management for all aspects of the wwmccs moder-
nization pre gram.
A. SCFTHABE
The cemputer operating system utilized with the
Honeywell equipment is "he General Comprehensive Operating
System (GCOS) designed by Honeywell. Honeywell also distri-
butes this operating system to civilian customers but the
Command and Control Technical Center must extensively modify
each GCOS release for security additions and unique WWMCCS
Software so the GCOS used within the WWMCCS community is
consistently several years behind the current civilian
version. GCOS was developed to support a single-site and
batch-oriented user community and has proven very successful
in such situations. Present day C3 system requirements
however, demand an online interactive processing capability.
While modifications to the Honeywell hardware and software
have improved performance, the basic circuitry is designed
for batch processing ana optimal performance will net be
achieved in an online interactive environment.
With any large data base system, a Data 3ase Management
System (OEMS) will be developed to allow easy retrieval and
updating of the data base. Generally, these management
systems are user-friendly and require minimal technical
expertise for successful use. The DBMS used with WWMCCS is
the WWilCCS Cat a Management System (WWDMS). Since WWDMS
resides on -.he Honeywell equipment, it relies on the GCOS
operating system; therefore WWDMS was designed around a
batch-oriented architecture. WWDMS uses GCOS to access
files for retrievals and updates. Because of the ineffi-
ciencies of the military version of GCOS in transferring
data in and cut of primary memory, the performance of WWDMS
is adversely affected. [Ref, 5: p. 25]
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Reports on the user- friendly aspect of wwdms have net
teen favorable- For the most part, the WWDMS language is
oriented towards the more technical personnel and is consid-
ered tec detailed for the average WWMCCS user with minimum
computer training. Consequently, users are not likely to
pursue the management system capabilities beyond standard
procedures and WWDMS 1 full facilities remained unused. Fcr
the community to exploit the systems and capabilities avai-
lable in MWMCC3, a u;;er- friendly and responsive DBMS is a
necessity. Since the concepts of a distributed databse
management system are new, a reliable query language could
suffice during the development interim. It should require
minimum computer experience and a minimum amount of special
training.
The need for a Miiti-Le vel Security system will not be
satisfied utilizing the the current WWMCCS Honeywell equip-
ment since this design incorporates only two machine states,
or rings. The rtaster state accomplishes the kernel func-
tions cf the operating system, password validation ana data
requests, as well as the functions for scheduling and allo-
cation cf resources. The second state is for user
applications programs, referred to as the Slave state.
[Hef. 5: p„ 29]
Since the security protection procedures, all system
software, and the resource allocation procedures reside in
the same ring, access to the specified ring area is common
to all users with access to any one section of that ring.
The current theory is that, under this scheme, any geed
systems programmer should be able to penetrate the kernel
section and gain access to all passwords and security
checking procedures.
Security alternatives to a ALS system are dedicated
computers, scheduled operations, and system-high security
operations. With dedicated computers, a separate computer
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is required for each security level and individual data
bases are required fcr each application requirement within
the different security levels. The scheduled operations
method insures all data per security level is processed at
separate times. This restricts users of different security
levels tc computer availability. The most difficult aspect
to this aethcd of secure processing is the sanitization
necessary between security level processing periods. The
entire system environment must be modified, both the machine
and physical facility. In addition, communications lines
must be broken, disk packs must be exchanged for the diffe-
rent security levels, and main memory cleared. This
procedure averages one to two hours to complete. [Ref. 5:
P. 28]
The third alternative, system-high security operations,
is primarily ised throughout the WWNCCS community. with
system-hiqh operatiors* ail personnel, physical space, and
equipment must be approved for the highest security level of
the information being processed. The biggest disadvantage
to this root hod is the restriction it places on the sharing
cf secure cciputer resources. In addition, this method
becomes costly in terms of physical security and personnel
clearances. The system-high security approach, if imple-
mented correctly, will satisfy security level requirements
but dees not address the need-to-know issue. [Ref. 5: p.
28]
E. HAEDH1BE
The availability of an electric power source greatly
affects the reliability and survivability of a computer
network such as the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN). For
the current WIN, there exists nc standard criteria for the
availability of electric power. If electric power is
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disrupted cr the air-conditioning damaged, data processing
capabilities are totally lost or, at a minimum, severely
degraded. Only a few WIN sites have a reliable backup power
source or redundant computer system. The National Military
Command Center (NMCC) maintains two independent power
sources for its computer system. This system affords
protection against various lccal power blackouts and irregu-
larities in the commercial power system. [Ref. 5: p. 29]
The NMCC alsc maintains a totally redundant computer system,
hardware and software, located at the Alternate National
Military Command Center (ANMCC) , which has an internal power
generating capability. In early WWMCCS years, the ANMCC was
considered hardened and fully self-supporting, but the
alternate site is nc longer considered hardened against t he
current threat. A few other large WWMCCS sites utilizing
commercial power are also armed with an internal power
generating capability, for instance, the North American Air
Defense Ccmicand (NORAD) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) .
Most ether WWMCCS sites have no reliable backup power
source.
Presently the NMCC has, of course, the most viaole
altS'rnate computer system — both redundant and remote.
Other sites maintain redundant data bases but usually in
close proximity. For example, the Joint Deployment Agency
maintains a backup JDS data base at the Readiness Command
(REDCCM) but which is physically located at the same
facility.
C. ITJY LEAGUE 82
During the period 1 March to 5 March 1982, the JCS
conducted a WWMCCS exercise, IVY LEAGUE 82. The exercise
was designed to evaluate defense operations run from the
NMCC at the Pentagon, then relocated to the alternate
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command center, the ANMCC. As the exercise progressed, WIN
performance dropped and response times reached an
unacceptable level. A DCA/CCTC sponsored IVY LEAGUE
Analysis Task Force vas organized to analyze the performance
of the WWMCCS ADP system and network, with concentration on
the particular problems encountered during the IVY LEAGUE
exercise- [Bef. 22: p. 1-1]
The Task Force focused its analysis on the four major
sites where the slowdown condition was most prevalent: the
NMCC Beadiness Systerr, the ANMCC, REDCOM, and the JDA.
These four sites were not all the WIN nodes participating in
the exercise, but it was felt, these sitas were indicative of
overall WIN performance during IVY LEAGUE 82. Information
was collected from on-site exercise personnel, manual legs
updated throughout the exercise, computer generated list-
ings, and WWMCCS computer system console legs from the
participating sites. [Ref. 22: p. v ]
The IVY IEAGUE Task Force revealed several major factors
contributing to the WIN degradation:
(1) excessive communications processor loading
(2) communications subnetwork fragmentation
(3) host computer resource contention
(4) software resource contention
(5) management of computer operations
Each cf these will be discussed in the following sections
with their impact on JDS performance.
D. CCHHUHICATIONS PBCCESSOR LOADING
The successful operation of the WIN network depends on
an unconstrained flow cf data between the computer system
and the network. A communications processor is used on the
network to coordinate inputs from remote terminals and send
them to the host system; it also receives outputs frcm the
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computer system and sends them to the correct user. The
communications processor handles the connection from the
host computer system to the network. The Honeywell Datanet
355 (EN 355) is the communications processor used throughout
the WWMCCS community.
The design cf the Datanet requires sufficient available
memory to process message traffic; otherwise the Datanet may
restrict the flow of traffic from the host to the network
and from remote sites to the host througa unsatisfactory
terminal response time and slow file transfers. The block
cf memory allocated for message processing is subdivided
into sections called buffers. Buffer size is dependent en
the type and number cf connections to the Datanet. The
greater the number of connections, the lower the available
memory and the lower the buffer size. WIN connections to
the Datanet must contend for buffer space with remote
processors, AUTODIN connections, and the local terminals.
[Ref . 22: p. 2-1 ]
During ivy LEAGUE 32, when the Datanet became over-
loaded, users experienced up to ten second pauses for system
response. Seme of this was attributaole to Datanet cver-
conf icuraticn -- too many connections to one Datanet. At
JDA, all 115 local terminals and the WIN connection were
served by the one Datanet. In some cases, several terminals
shared one line into the communications processor which
further hindered terminal response time. In addition to the
terminal overloading, this same Datanet also served the
AUTODIN interface at all four sites reviewed. [ Bef - 22: p.
2-1] With this Datanet configuration, any terminal discon-
nect from the system or any Datanet failure affects all
connected terminals, both local and remote. Considering the
large number of terminals connected, the chance of a Datanet
failure or system reinitialization (reboot) to clear
terminal or WIN problems is extremely high. Figure 4.1
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graphically depicts user-dependence on the DN 355/Host link..








Figure 4.1 JDA Configuration.
During periods of particularly bad performance in IVY
LEAGUE 82, cemputar data dumps wera taken from the REBCGM
Datanet. JEA Datanet dumps were not available, but the
REDCOM configuration was considered similar to that of JD&
with 139 local terminals connected to the one Datanet. Data
retrieved revealed 4,490 data transfer requests denied
during a 17-hour period because of insufficient buffer
space. During a separata 22-hour period, an additional
U,651 data transfers were d =nied due to lack cf buffer
space. These nuibers only reflect Datanet denials, local
Interface Message Processor (IM?) and terminal malfunctions
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may also have occurred. During IVY LEAGUE 82, the JD<\ hcst
computer received an average of 150,000 transactions per
day. Specifically, en 2 March, JDA processed 252,864 tran-
sactions and 87,U17 transactions were processed en u. March.
[Hef. 22: p. 2-2]
Another hinderance to Datanet performance was operator
reboots cf the Datanet. Operations would frequently reini-
tialize the Datanet in an attempt to free blocked terrcinils
or solve WIN problems and various other abnormalities cccur-
ring in the network. [Ref. 22: p. 2-1] Although the
specific impact cf these Datanet restarts were not analyzed,
they cbvicusly affected WIN performance. For instance, the
Joint Deployment System tranfers TPFDD files and TPFDD file
changes tc remote sites through the WIN FTS. If a Datanet
reboot occurs during this time, the file transfer must be
recovered. Previous to the development of the Remote User's
Eackage (EUP), transaction recovery meant file transfer
reinitialization. Now, the JDS Update Processor (JDSUE)
dynamically generates checkpoints throughout the transfer tc
allow file transfer recovery at the point cf disconnection.
The WWKCCS cemmunity employs Datanet performance moni-
toring software to warn of possible Datanet overload. This
monitoring software requires approximately 2,500 words cf
memory which further reduces the Datanet memory availaoici
for nessage processing buffers. Consequently, at all four
sites included in the analysis, the monitoring software wis
net in execution. [ Bef . 22: p. 2-1]
E. NETWOBK FRAGMENTATION
As discussed in the previous section, the WWMCCS network
is very susceptible to interruptions cccuring within the
lines cf ccmmunicaticns. Any network configuration changes,
component outages, or circuit failures will cause
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fragmentation of the network into subnet works , thus
degrading performance. [Ref. 22: p. 3-1] Each »WMCCS hcst
computer involved in the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network is
linked tc a Honeywell minicomputer called an Interface
Message Processor (IMP), and the various IMPs are then
interconnected.
During IVY LEAGUE 82, the Network Operations Center
(NOC) and BCA Operations Center (DCAOC) were relocated to
the alternate command center, the &NMCC. To provide
continued support for these nodes on the WIN subnetwork, the
master IMF, normally at the Pentagon, was logically recon-
figured tc the backup facility at the Command and Control
Technical Center (CCTC) , Reston. Changes were necessary
within the WIN subnetwork due to the backup IMF's limita-
tions and circuit availability. The major modification was
the deletion of the link from the master IMP to the IMP at
Headguart ers, Atlantic Command. As the exercise progressed,
it became evident that the loss of this one particular link
proved tc be a major factor in network fragmentation *
During these periods cf fragmentation, the exchange of data
between WIN sites was totally disrupted. [Bef* 22: p„ 3-2]
Although the IMP and circuit outages were usually short,
these, ccupled with the major configuration changes,
severely degraded WIN performance. For instance en 2 March,
88 circuit outages occured for a total cf 5.13 hours
down-time. Later in the exercise on 4 March, a sum loss of
7.72 hours uas felt during 138 circuit outages. For the
entire IVY LEAGUE 82 exercise, 476 line outages occured with
65 extending over 10 minutes, 22 of these outages were the
result of reguired cryptographic key changes. Key changes
were a freguent cause for circuits displaced from normal
activities. IMP outages for the exercise totaled 334 with
52 lasting ever 10 minutes: 77 at 6.63 hours en 2 March and




During IVY LEAGUE 82, numerous cases of host resource
misuse occurred in areas such as primary memory allocation,
job priority assignment, and improper implementation cf WIN
software. These conflicts severely 11 mi tad the host system
performance. The Analysis Task Force studied these prctlems
at the NMCC Feadiness and ANMCC computer systems only, but
it was felt similar situations existed at numerous ether
UWMCCS sites. [Bef. 22: p. 4-1]
The NMCC WWMCCS site is segregated into two distinct
computer systems: Readiness and Support. Thr: Readiness
System is designed fcr the operation of HWMCCS standard
software and other site-unigue software that has previously
teen tested and is new in production. The NMCC Support
System is an identical configuration to the Readiness system
and exists fcr the development and testing cf new software.
Cnly the Readiness System participates in JCS exercises as
the Support System continues to support daily operations.
Priorities fail so that the Support System may be sacrificed
to maintain the performance of the Readiness System.
With cnly fully operational software allowed on the NMCC
Readiness System, the percentage of aborted jobs is expected
to be small. During the exercise, the amount cf computer
resources expended cr. jobs which ultimately aborted was
unacceptably high. Some aborts were due to magnetic tape
and various ether hardware problems, out an undesirable
number were caused by software still in the developmental
stags. [Bef. 22: p. 4-2] Prior to a new WWMCCS software
release, the temptation for programmers to use the Readiness
System as a testbed fcr application system modifications is
high. The response time is decidedly better en the
Readiness System because of decreased aDorts and code optim-
ization. Guidelines for testing state all systems resident
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on the Readiness system to be tested and/or modified will be
transferred to the Support System. After verification with
the new WWMCCS software, the modified system will then
replace the old systen on the Readiness computer. The idea,
of course, is to preserve the Readiness computer in both
time and space requirements for crisis/exercise support and
employ a second system for the heavy processing and the
usually large space consumption of software development.
Beth systems studied, the HMCC Readiness and the ANMCC
system, suffered froB a lack cf availaole memory for
processing. In particular, on 2 Karch memory shortages
severely cor.strained processing capabilities for a five hour
period. Under the current WWMCCS ADP, it is possible tc
dynaiically reconfigure a system without completely bringing
it off-line; for example, allowing the addition of memory to
the best computer system during an exs::cise. [Ref. 22: p.
1-1] fllthcugh infreguentiy done, memory may be acquired from
the NSCC Support System to improve the performance cf the
Readiness System.
A standard WWMCCS program size is cipproximately 60K (60
x 1024 bytes). Any cne application program requiring mere
than 6 OK or a large amount of CPU time, should be remodeled
to include code optimization and some iiethcd of memory
overlays or paging. [Ref. 22: p.. <*- 1 ]
In addition to large memory utilization, numerous jobs
with high priorities running simultaneously will affect
system performance. Honeywell supports an urgency system
for determining job priorities -- urgencies may vary from
zero to 63. Typically, urgencies of 30 and below are used
for user application programs; for example, routine batch
and TSS jobs are assigned an urgency of 5. Urgencies above
30 are reserved for system software applications and special
production runs. Urgencies higher than 50 support system
programs such as TLCP, FTS, and other WIN software.
[Ref. 22: p. 4-2]
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Statistics show approximately thirty percent of all
activities processed en the ANJ1CC computer system during the
exercise had urgency levels greater than or equal to the
urgency levels of system functions. Software such as 1SS
and WIN have urgencies from 50 to 60 to allow primary access
to the prccessor. During IVY LEAGUE 82, this software was
competing with user application software for computer
resources because of unjustified high user application
urgencies. [Ref. 22: p. 4-1]
The KWHCCS systen consols operator has the ability to
override system prescribed urgencies. This is usually
accomplished on a case by case basis for ad-hec production
runs. Any systeir reguiring a large block of memory,
substantial CPU time, or lengthy input/output processing
will normally be awarded a lower urgency, causing it to
remain in the system a relatively longer length of time.
When the urgencies of these systems are bumped to higher
levels, whether justified or not, they compete with system
software, usually large time-consuming systems themselves
and the •rrolasses condition' occurs -- total system slow-
down. An inordinate amount of automated bookkeeping is
necessary fcr proper resource availability and the processor
becomes overloaded. When this condition occurs, known as
thrashing, the effectiveness of the Honeywell urgency system
drops to zero.
The cumulative affect of all the above mentioned situa-
tions equals increased user response time and user
frustration. During normal NMCC operations, TSS response
time averages five to seven seconds; during heavy usage,
exercises or crises, response time increases incrementally




WIN software is ret always the 'victim 1 of poor WIN
performance. Some software, both systems software and
application systems, contribute to the increase in host
system processing requirements. When these requirements
exceed system ca [abilities, support of local and network
operation decreases.
Seme of the fcIN system software particularly affected by
degraded network performance includes:
(1) Teleconferencing (TLC?) System
(2) File Transfer Service (FTS)
(3) Tele com inundations program (TELNET). [Ref. 22:
p. 6-1]
The Teleconferencing capability in WIN allows users tc
rejoin the conference and request a transcript file of
actions since that site's las- log-on. These files are
spooled to the printer at a high urgency for speedy
printing. During IVY LEAGUE 82, the large number of tran-
script file requests severely impacted the performance cf
the system hosting the teleconference.
The File Transfer Service employed in the WIN utilizes a
dynamic memory management scheme to maintain an available
memory level between the minimum and maximum guidelines.
The management system constantly allocates and deallocates
sections cf memory as small as 1K to sustain an acceptable
memory level. Th:.s continuous processing requirement places
a heavy lead on the host processor. Also, during a file
transfer, FTS reads and writes one Little Link (LLINK) cf
data a + a + tima, 320 wcrds. This limits possible transfer
rates and FTS effectiveness. [Ref. 22: p. 6-1]
TELNET uses software similar to the FTS memory manage-
ment software. Although this imposes additional loading on
the processing system, the contribution to system leading is
not as significant as FTS or TLCF. [Ref. 22: p. 6-1]
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G. JES BESCORCE CONTENTION
Large software applications used over the "rfWMCCS
network, such as the Joint Deployment System, need tc be
concerned abcut resource requirements and operational effi-
ciency. Since such a wide degree of diversity exists among
application systems, no guidelines for standardization of
new WSMCCS software have been established; therefore, these
issues are left to the developing agency. For instance, the
Joint Deployment System maintains two interactive subsys-
tems, the JDSIP and JDSUP as part of the 3emots User*s
Package (BOP). The Analysis Task Force contends these two
subsystems fail to take the best advantage of the standard
WWMCCS software features and consequently generate substan-
tial overhead for the processor. After analysis of IVY
LEAGUE 82, the need was evident to redesign portions cf the
JDS scf-cwar^ to insure more efficient processing and
overhead ninimization. [Ref. 22: p. 6-3]
The operation of the JDSIP caused noticable degradation
durinc the exercise. The Interface Processor subsystem
requires 28K to process and runs with an urgency of 51. The
JDSIF will remain in memory as long as it is processing
transactions. When the processor is not required, i.e., no
transactions to be processed, the JDSIP will place itself in
a 'sleep state 1 — degrading its urgency to zero which
immediately allows it to be swapped out of the system at the
next scemory allocation request. Actually, this should be
very efficient use of memory, or at least 28K. The problem
arises in waking up the JDSIP. Since the subsystem has no
leans cf determining when the next transaction will be
received, the JDSIP periodically, abcut every two tc three
seconds, resets its urgency back to 51 which returns it tc
memory where it can check for transactions to be processed.
If no transactions are waiting, the urgency is returned to
zero and the cycle repeats. [3ef. 22: p. 6-3]
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This scheme is at its worst when JDS is rarely used on a
given system. The JESIP simply fluctuates from mass storage
to primary memory with no advantage. This swapping back and
forth creates unnecessary overhead processing and can seri-
ously degrade network performance. Case in point: en 1
March, during IVY LEAGUE 82, the JDSIP was swapped a total
cf 412 times in an eight-minute period, from 1355 to 1403.
[Ref. 22: p. 6-3 ]
The JDS Opdate Processor (JDSU?) poses a similar situa-
tion. The JCSUP requires only 9K to process and runs at an
urgency cf 55. During certain processing periods, the JDSUP
must request a single block cf 50K of memory. When this
regusst enters the system, the system will immediately rear-
range its memory to accommodate the request from such a high
priority jot. Usually, a system interruption is evident.
A:ter the JDSU? has completed that process, the 50K is
returned to memory; however, the JDSU? in general immedi-
ately asks for another single blcck of 50K to continue
processing. [Ref. 22: p. 6-3]
The allocation ard deallocation of this 50K of memory
proved to be detrimental during the IVY LEAGUE exercise. On
2 March, JDSUP requested 50K at 0120, released the memory at
0'122, and requested another 50K block at 0125. This cycle
cf r equest-release-r eguest was repeated during the 0330-0340
time pericd that same day. [Ref. 22: p. 6-3]
H. SA8AGEHEBT OF COMPUTER OPERATIONS
During IVY LEAGUE 82, it became evident that hardware
and software problems were net entirely responsible for the
C3 system degradation. The overall management and control




As part of the normal opera-ions of all WIN sites, hard-
ware such as the host computer system, the Datanet, and the
IMPs are reinitialized in an attempt to solve various prob-
lems. These reboots interrupt network performance and can
impact local user operations. In addition to unexpected
down time and reboots, scheduled outages occur at all sites.
The WKMCCS community has no standard guidelines for the
scheduling cf these outages. Frequently, these unscheduled
downtimes are not justified; for instance, during the exer-
cise, a Datanet was rebooted to allow a single user access
to a particular system for a local processing requirement.
This reboot affected all users on that subnetwork.
On 3 March, the ANMCC discontinued service to remote
users because of an apparent memory shortage problem.
According to VIDEO, an online display system which allows
monitoring cf system status, minimum work was being
processed because of a lack cf available memory. The after
exercise analysis however, revealed approximately 150K cf
memory available during that time frame. The discrepancy
occurred due to improper use of the VIDEO system. This
system is designed tc provide an instantaneous picture cf
system resources. The system was likely restructuring
memory to accommodate the increased wcrklcad when the deci-
sion was made to detach all remote users. [Ref. 22: p. 5-2]
Another operational contribution to poor network perfor-
mance occurred when 5TS was used to transfer files around
withir. the same site, as opposed to using a COPY utility.
Transferring a file with sending and receiving sites speci-
fied as the same sit€, sends the file to the local IMP which
immediately returns the file to the same host. During IVY
LEAGUE 82, exercise statistics showed that 342 of ail file
transfers at the NMCC were same-site transfers, as were 6 7%
cf Military Airlift Command (MAC) transfers and 833 at the
WWMCCS site supporting the Commander-in-Chief, Naval Forces
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Europe. [Ref. 22: p. 5-3] This type of functional misuse
wastes best system resources and contributes to WIN loading,
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V. RECOKMENMIIQM AND CONCLUSIONS
When the current WWMCCS/WIN management problems are
addressed during the modernization phase, network perfor-
mance should improve. This will decrease user frustration,
especially during high volume times, and increase user
activity en the system. This increase in volume in turn,
may affect system performance and, with greater user parti-
cipation comes additional site- unique software. Site-unique
applications are created due to deficiencies within the
system which will always exist in a system as large as
WWMCCS. The WIS modernization plan does not propose to
eliminate this unique category of WWMCCS software, just
minimize its proportion to standard software.
A. SOFTWARE
The WIS modernization plan includes a new operating
system release, GCOS 8.0, and a modified Honeywell main-
frame, the H6000 Distributed Processing System (DPS).
The major software modifications include:
(1) improved data management and timesharing
processing
(2) DPS software written in a high order language
which facilitates maintenance and modifications
(3) increased number of timesharing users from 200
to 600
(4) increased number of concurrent processes from 64
to 511 [Ref. 23]
Net mentioned in the WIS modernization plan is ary just-
ification that this increase in possible user activity will
not further degrade system performance. Although a new
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processor is under consideration, the H60QQ DPS modifica-
tion, a significant increase in processing capability is
already critical to maintain availability cf present WWMCCS
software. Increasing the number of time sharing users
three-fold will cuickly com sume any available processing
time
.
The WWMCCS modernization plan also includes the CM4
software package for tetter file management, allowing diffe-
rent file structures for files in the same data base, and an
enhanced DBMS, the Integrated Data Store II (IDS II) , With
the current IDS I, the progammer is not independent cf the
data tass -- one of the fundamental requirements of e. Data
Ease Management System, when using IDS I, the user must
know the data base layout, referred to as the schema, and
must include various system routines to successfully update
the data tase. IDS II will be more cf a true DBMS, allowing
user independence from the data base schema.
With a true DBMS, more users are likely to pursue infor-
mation contained within the system, thus increasing user
retrievals from remote sites, i.e., retrieval requests from
the JCS, and increasing data transfers on WIN. Again, the
WIS modernization plan lacks an apparent knowledge of acw to
handle this increase in activity.
Although the basic software design of the WWMCCS equip-
ment is inadequate for a Multi-Level Security (MLS) system,
there has been a proposal using hardware modifications.
Honeywell has developed a system, the Honeywell Secure
Communications Processor (SCOMP) , which runs on the
Honeywell Level 6 minicomputer and is billed as a MLS
system. SCOMP utilizes four rings of protection with the
kernel residing in Ring and the least priviledged ring,
Eing 3, belcnging to the users. But SCOMP also modifies the
hardware fcy supplying a hardware segmentation capability for
dividing main memory into distinct logical (net physical)
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areas. This should allow access checking cer segment for
read/write priviledgss, thus maintaining controlled software
sharing among many users. [Ref. 24: p. 4]
Whil€ SCCMP has not been fully validated by the DOD
Computer Security Center, part of the National Security
Agency (NSA) , it is considered a large step towards the
secure, time-shared computer resources needed in cemmunit ies
such as the WWMCCS community. In December 1931, the
security center published a Product Evaluation Bulletin
specifying that SC0J1F "... should be considered an accep-
table candidate for a wide range of minicomputer
applications which require an enhanced architecture to
suppcrt secure processing requirements." [Sef« 25]
Accther emerging alternative is the ELACK2R Technology.
ELACKER will supply end-to-end encryption through the
ELACKER Terminal Access System (TAS) . This IAS is a PDF
11/70 or PDF 11/34 ard acts as a buffer be -ween the network
and hest computers for security verification. Upon leg-on,
each user will be assigned a one time key for the life of
the terminal session. These keys will be checked and veri-
fied before access tc each data base is allowed. They will
also be used to control inadvertent misrouting of ia*a,
referred to as spillage. [ Ref . 26: p. 6 ]
The main idea behind the BLACKER prototype is tc allev-
iate the burden cf numerous passwords for each user per each
host computer. Passwords are no longer considered secure
for seme classif icat icn levels because they must be stored
within the computer system and users frequently violate
security procedures by writing them down. One of the mest
viable alternatives proposed has been the use of magnetic
strip identification badges and electronic badge readers.
This system would allcw for minimum manual intervention.
[Ref. 26: p. 17]
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A MLS system would allow the Joint Deployment Agency to
control access tc various capabilities in specific OPLANs.
Presently, all host computers and personnel mast be cleared
to the highest security level of any piece of data contained
in the OELAN.
Functioning without a MLS system, full utilization cf
WWMCCS resources is improbable and the sharing of comput-r
resources over the network: is restricted. During the
interim between the present security procedures and the
eventual development cf a MLS system for WWMCCS, the WIS JPM
becomes the central WWMCCS security officer to standardize
physical security procedures and set guidelines on the
handling cf different security levels on the same machine.
E. HAECWAHE
The WIS modernization plan does not address the issue of
redundant power supplies. The vulnerability of computer
hardware to electric power for operations and support, i.e.,
air conditioning, is immense. With very few WWMCCS nodes
having a reliable backup power source, the network should
not be considered survivable.
Included in the rear-term WIS modernization program is
the procurement of the Honeywell 6000 Distributed Processing
System (DPS) modification. The H6000 DPS offers major hard-
ware and software improvements over the K606Q and H6080
equipment currently used in the WWMCCS community. Major
hardware changes include:
(1) 70% to 90^ increased processing speed
(2) space, power, and air-conditioning requirement
red uct ions




The Honeywell mainframes presently used are fas-
approaching the age of computer antiquity. The largest
problem centers around the Hor.syweLl architecture which was
not designed to support an online, interactive environment.
When hardware replacement is considered, the WWMCCS host
computers should be replaced with computer systems designed
to support a real-time, online, interactive environment.
The changing requirements for :ietwork software, moving
this software onto the Datanet processors, and advancements
in computer technology have all reduced the mainframe
requirements for most WWMCCS sites, For hardware acquisi-
tion, WHMCCS sites will consider a series of minicomputers,
for instance the Honeywell Level 6 minicomputers, versus one
large machine. Of course, each site would be unique in
configuration but a typical WKKCCS site could employ one
Level 6 for each of the following i unctions: tne AUTOETN
message processing, the HI$ connection to include handling
TLCF support, the ADF-LO functions, and ail resident data
bases and local processing requirements.
C. COMMUNICATIONS PSOCSSSOH
The WwttCCS community has communications processor moni-
toring software which consumes 2,500 words of Datanet memory
when implemented but can supply valuable information en
Datanst overload situations. The implementation of this
monitoring software for the Datanet is not a requirement for
WIN sites, but each site should perform a trade-off analysis
on memory required and information received. The statis-
tical output froi the monitoring software could reduce
Datanet reboots by notifying operators of potential weak-
nesses in the system; i.e., running out of buffer space for
message processing or the number of transfer denials
exceeding an acceptable level. If memory space cannot be
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supplied during a crisis/exercise situation for the moni-
toring software, controlled simulations using the Datanet
monitoring software should be implemented to forecast poten-
tially threatening process combinations to the Datanet.
A set of standard sy:-rtem guidelines should be develcpsd
for use at all WIN sites to establish acceptable criteria
for Datanet reboots. Frequent rebooting as a first try at
solving a network problem should be discouraged.
Also, a WIN software validation package should be devel-
oped tc prohibit file transfers within the same site.
Included should he installation checks to insure WWMCCS
Standard System Software is installed properly and site
cptiens are set at tbe prescribed level. [Bef. 22: p. 7-4]
The Catanet cverconf iguration problem, i.e., 115 termi-
nals linked to one Datanet at JDA, lends itself to two
recommendations. The first solution is simple but rather
expensive -- procure more Honeywell Datanet 355 processors.
Ideally, this would allow one Datanet to be dedicated tc
that site's WIN connection. This configuration would reduce
WIN problems associated with operator reboots of the Datanet
to solve ncn-WIN problems. [Ref. 22: p. 2-2] With addi-
tional Datanets, user leal could be better distributed and
Datanet failures would have less impact on the site perfor-
mance . At a minimum, sites should avoid linking high volume
connections such as BIN, MJTODIN, and the JCS ADP Liason
Cfficer (ADPLO) terminals on the same Datanet. In addition,
sites should adhere tc the standard WWMCCS loading levels
for the Datanet as directed by the WWMCCS ADP Advisory
Memorandum (WAAM).
The second recommendation is to eliminate the Honeywell
communications processor equipment and transfer these func-
tions either to another vendor communications processor or
to a minicomputer, such as the Honeywell Level 6 minicom-
puter. The Honeywell Datanet 355 is limited in a memory
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sizs which is no longer sufficient for the normal message
processing capacity at large WIN sites. Using the Lavel 6
minicomputer in series would alleviate the memory problems
and provide additional processing capabilities.
D. HETWOBK FRAGMENTATION
To prevent the reoccurrence of problems similar to the
cr.es caused by the Master IMP being reconfigured during IVY
IEAGUZ 32, contingency plans should be devised to eliminate
the drastic configuration changes as were necessary when
such a targetable USE was deleted from the network. Studies
and crisis/exercise ucnitoring should be undertaken to
predict possible circuit rr IMP links which could initiate
network fragmentation. [Ref. 22: p. 3-9] After identifying
these areas, they shculd ba reinforced during high volume
times by redundant configuration or specific rerouting
algorithms.
After the C/30 switch upgrade, part of the WWMCCS moder-
nization plan, IMP and circuit outages shculd decrease. The
C/30 switch will provide tandem processing of up to 3C0
packets per second, fcr a total of 900 packets being
processed. Routing and rerouting will ba accomplished by
adaptive routing algorithms which will reroute individual
packats to the shortest path. In addition, monitoring and
control functions are included to provide fault isolation
and hardware and software problem diagnosis.
Replacing the huge WWMCCS network with a series of local
Area Networks (LANs) will alleviate some of the degradation
felt during network fragmentation. Moving the network soft-
ware from the Honeywell mainframes onto the Datanets is the
first step in building independent LANs. Eventually, all
network software should be moved, alleviating the mainframe
from any network control responsibilities. This would
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remove the restriction for standard hardware for all win
sites. With no standard hardware limitations, users could
tailor the acquisition of new hardware around specific site
requirements. Since all host systems will be linked through
a coalmen network, minimum compatibility problems should be
experienced.
E. RESOOBCE CONTENTION
One popular recommendation for the mainframe processor
contention problem is the addition of another processor fcr
the NMCC Readiness System. This additional processor would
be justified during an exercise but not fully utilized
during daily operations.
As opposed tc procuring an additional processor, the
Support System cculd be modified to temporarily provide the
necessary hardware/scftware equipment during crisis/exercise
situations. The mair advantage to this plan is reduced
swapping ::or CPU contention. [ Ref . 22: p. 4-3] The validity
of this plan is somewhat questionable. Previous to the NMCC
WWMCCS computer system division into* Readiness and Support
systeros, there was a H6080 machine with two processors. CPU
contention reached a level to warrant the separation of
produrticr. and development efforts, thus was born another
computer system strictly for developmental efforts.
Configuration now stands at two separate systems with one
processor each. As lentioned in a previous section, users
do not always respect the guidelines for use of these two
systems. In light of user-induced problems affecting
performance, stronger enforcements of implemented procedures
would be more cost- affective. The recommendation fcr an
additional processor is expensive whether the dollars are
spent actually procuring another processor which will be
fully utilized only about twenty-five percent of the time or
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the Support System software is used for high- priority usage.
During the later option, numerous software development
personnel with no planned participation in a crisis/exercise
environment, would be without a computer processor which
greatly restricts their developmental efforts.
Also hindering processor performance is the Honeywell
urgency scheme for processes. The basic idea of the
Honeywell urgency scheme is acceptable. The urgency scheme
needs adjusting and the implementation should be modified
for tighter controls en the system console operator's
ability to override the system default urgencies. Also,
enhancements to prohibit application software from reaching
urgencies in the WIN software level is necessary. This
would discourage resource competition and improve system
slowdown. One urgency system recommended included net
allowing any application software to exceed an urgency cf
10. Few users, mostly system programmers, would operate a*,
urgencies cf 30 to 40 and no users would exceed 40. This
proposal leaves urgencies of 40 to 63 for system software
and WIN software.
A new TSS Monitor has been developed within the WWMCCS
community. This monitoring software is easy to use via
system console commands and no system interruption is exper-
ienced. Onf crtunately, this new Monitor was not operational
for IVY LEAGUE 82; but it can be utilized during the next
exercise for selected small periods of time to allow a mere
thorough analysis of slowdown periods. [Hef. 22: p. 4-4]
With the WIS modernization plan, the capability to monitor
each network element is achieved through the Monitoring
Canters cf the DDN. DDN will also provide an automatic
fault recognition and isolation for trouble spots with most
reconfigurations being handled without dedicated personnel.
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WIN software, such as the memory management algorithms
for PIS and TELNET, should be redesigned to reduce the allo-
cation and deallocation processing for memory. One
alternative could be a minimum size of memory allowed for
allocation, this would eliminate the overhead generated in
the swapping of 1K.
Additionally, improved operational procedures are needed
concerning teleccnf erencing transcript files. Options avai-
lable include:
(1) spooling the printed output with a lower urgency
which would force printing at less critical times
(2) allowing printing of the transcript file
reguests only during scheduled time periods
The rescurce contention problem, especially at the NMCC,
is stated as a top priority of the WIS modernization plan;
however, no tangible alternatives have been proposed.
F. JDS BESCDBCB CONTENTION
The memory chasing problems of the JDSIP and JDSUP
subsystems may be approached from several alternatives.
Obviously, the aiount of allocation/deallocation depends
almost entirely on the idle-time of the subsystem. Studies
should be conducted at each site supporting the Remcte
User's Package (RU?) to determine its use/idle ratio. If
the JDSIF subsystem remains in memory the majority cf the
time, Jtininum overhead is generated. If the JDSIP use/idle
ratio is small, significant overhead will be generated by
the subsystem changing urgencies to engage placement in cere
and the chance of checking for transaction activities. &n
alternative would be the development dl a small check-
routine to permanently reside in primary memory. Its job
would be to periodically, every two to three seconds, check
for mcciing transactions and change the JDSIP urgency to 51
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if transactions are available for processing, at the sarre
time changing its owr urgency to zero. This would produce a
sleep state similar to -chat of the JDSIP when inactive, only
the check-routine would not leave core. When the JDSIP
finished the necessry transaction processing, it wculd
decrease its urgency to zero and change the check-routine
urgency tc 51. This would allow the JDSIP to be swapped to
mass storage at the next memory request and the check-
routine wculd have high priority for processor time and
resume waiting for the next transaction.
Another alternative to be considered is the permanent
allocation cf 288 to the JDSIP. This would allow the JDSIP
permanent residence in primary memory and is feasible if the
host system is not memory-restricted.
The JESUS subsystem remains in primary memory itself at
9K but periodically requires an addition 50K for processing.
Part cf the problem concerning the JDSUP memory allocation
stems frcn the J?SUP requiring one single block of 5CK cf
Doemory. Generally, the system must rearrange memory tc
create a contiguous 50K block. The easiest solution wculd
te the permanent attachment of -he 5 OK to the JDSUP
subsystem. For 2 system memory-restricted at all, this
alternative is i upra ctical. A more feasible alternative-
would be to include 50K in the system size for the JDSUP and
treat the 59K as one system. Then modify the JDSUP to
reside en mass stoarge and utilize a check -routine, similar
to the JESIF, for dynamic checking cf requirements. The
same urgency swapping and processing schemes could be
utilized.
In addition to the specific modifications to the JES
subsystem, several other measures could be taken tc improve
WIN rescurce requirements:




(2) standard criteria for resource requirements in
new software
(3) code optimization and memory overlays fcr larger
systems
(4) utilization of data compression techniques
(5) imprcved input/output interfaces
(6) more efficient data transaction activites
(7) elimination of large data transfers
G. CONCLUSIONS
Cne of the largest problems with the Defense Data
Network (DDN) will be the Multi-Level Security issue. With
the variety of users linked through ens common network, a
RLS system will be imperative.
Another DDN concern is the standard data communications
protocol.-:. These protocols should not only interface with
the WSMCCS sites, but should be able to interact with NATO
systems ::or greater interoperability. The Wis J?M presently
intends to require standard protocols be written in the new
EOD d€sigr. language, ADA. While no ADA compiler has been
fully certified as meeting all DOD standards, the step
towards standard software should begin at software
cene spticn.
The WIS modernization plan will bring modern software
and later hardware into the WWMCCS community. The Wis JPM
strategy is to tackle the softwara problems in wWMCCS first
and bypass the fast icving tachnology field of hardware
until later. Not all of the WWMCC3 standard software needs
rewriting and by modernizing the software first, the WWMCCS
network will become more adept to present day requirements.
WWMCCS HEP problems will not be solved by the WIS moder-
nization plan or hardware changes alone. The WWMCCS
computer systems ara used for war-gaming and software
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development but the primary intention of this C3 system
surfaces during crises with the handling of message traffic.
The heart of the WWMCCS ADP program must be a fast, reliable
and secure transaction processing system. Faster routing
algorithms irust be developed and improved physical surviv-
ability is critical. Now, every node on the WWMCCS network
is vulnerable to easy destruction and each node lost has a
great impact on total system performance.
The WIS modernization plan with an improved DBMS,
management and security procedures, and user interface is a
significant start towards the remodeling of WWMCCS. The
modernization is planned over a ten year period and a major
concern will be maintaining service dollar support.
The Joint Deployment System will certainly benefit frcm
the WIS modernization plan. But the areas of network
management, multi-level security, and resource contention
must be addressed by the modernization plan and alternatives
proposed. In the meantime, the Joint Deployment Agency will
continue to develop JCS-unique software to supplement WWMCCS
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